The work of the American educator and academic Arland D. Weeks (1871–1936) constitutes an interesting effort to contribute to the reform of society on the basis of an adequate knowledge of the human mind. He was a political progressivist, and his writings are representative of the prevailing pragmatist, functionalist ‘spirit of the times’. Deeply concerned with the making of good citizens, he approached the field of work with a critical eye, making specific recommendations and proposals for improving the efficiency and (...) fostering the personal development of the individual worker. The aim of this article is to analyse such proposals in the light both of their psychological bases and of the ideological and social environment to which they were addressed. (shrink)

A partir del contrapeso que Ortega encuentra en la contradictoria vida de Goethe, se atreve con una nueva definición para la biografía como interrelación de tres elementos que se enfrentan: circunstancia, vocación y azar. Con lo que la enmarca en su propuesta filosófica, desde su ontología, como drama, como género literario, con ese matiz de construcción, que pretende ser una propuesta más audaz que la del ser idealista, porque incluye el entorno en el yo. Como una ética del ser que (...) se enmarca, como escribió ya Aranguren, en una metafísica de nuestra vida, que Ortega entiende como quehacer. (shrink)

La autonomía del arte es un punto de partida común para forjar una significación para el arte de vanguardias. Con ella, los manifiestos y estudios críticos apuntan lecturas epistemológicas y sociales, que parten necesariamente de una reflexión desde la ontología, sobre la naturaleza de ese arte. Pero Ortega se queda sólo en lo ontológico para hacer del arte una entidad de naturaleza radicalmente distinta a la realidad del espectador. Porque lo que pretende es hacer orbitar también el arte -con las (...) vanguardias (desde la autoconciencia de autónomas que él les supone)- en torno al eje de su filosofía, como mecanismo de evasión de la realidad radical que es para cada individuo su propia vida. (shrink)

The first studies in Philosophy that studied digital technology did not specify the characteristics of its various technical applications or instruments. They looked at the virtual reality and used the metaphor of immersion to study the set of all technological developments, as had been done before with the novel. Thus, Internet is misunderstood by many experts as virtuality (next to Baudrillard), rather than linking its hypertext system closer to other theories like those proposed by Deleuze and Guattari or Bourriaud.

Ortega presenta su metafísica como un sistema de imágenes alrededor de la novela como metáfora de la vida. Pero confunde el sujeto y el objeto referenciales en su explicación de la vida como acción, porque previamente no ha trabajado lo suficiente en su estética el personaje. Zambrano, en cambio, sí tiene una reflexión propia del personaje que le permite moverse mejor en la analogía, verle más aspectos. Por ejemplo, el envés desde la ética de la condición de proyectivo del hombre (...) : para Zambrano una actitud reprobable como comportamiento buscado, el sacrificio de la vida a un esquema preconcebido reductor. Lo que llama «novelería» en su lectura de la Nina de Galdós. (shrink)

Este artículo propone reunir a la literatura y la filosofía en un mecanismo didáctico para estimular la práctica de la filosofía con la lectura y la escritura de relatos, con los postulados del constructivismo, en torno a hacer filosofía, no solo observarla desde fuera. Parte de dos premisas: 1) el cuento moderno funciona como pregunta filosófica, como presentador de los grandes temas filosóficos, pero 2) evita la tentación de una explicación explícita, que queda elidida, para que sea el lector quien (...) acabe dándole una forma definitiva con su interpretación, participando en la construcción de su significado. (shrink)

Ortega, aunque comprime su metafísica hasta formularla con su “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia”, no escribe apenas de esa circunstancia: de su condición y posibles aspectos. Del binomio con que explica la vida trabaja solo en la reacción del individuo, convertida su propuesta metafísica en una ética que confía en las fuerzas del sujeto para desarrollar su proyecto vital en cualquier entorno. Aún es de día, que publica Miguel Delibes en 1949, con la España de posguerra de fondo, puede (...) leerse como una réplica a esta ética que Ortega llama de la ilusión: Su protagonista, ante una circunstancia abiertamente hostil, es incapaz de desarrollar el programa que quiere para su vida. La trama funciona como planteamiento de una ética que recalcula las posibilidades del individuo para realizarse en un entorno adverso. (shrink)

RESUMENLa analogía de Ortega del actor arrojado a un escenario no supone, como se ha sugerido en distintos trabajos, la inclusión de su metafísica en el entorno del tópico que entiende el mundo como un teatro. La identificación del individuo con un actor que debe transformarse en el personaje que perfila su vocación implica una concepción de mi vida, entendida como creación propia, opuesta a la del theatrum mundi, donde al actor le es asignado un papel ya escrito que debe (...) representar dócilmente. Con todo, su definición del actor como metáfora corporizada converge –o puede llegar a converger- con su noción metafísica del hombre como existencial metáfora. Aunque Ortega no es explícito en este punto.PALABRAS CLAVE«IDEA DEL TEATRO», THEATRUM MUNDI, VOCACIÓN, RES DRAMÁTICA, METÁ- FORA CORPORIZADAABSTRACTOrtega’s analogy of the actor who is thrown into a scenario does not imply the inclusion of his metaphysics in the literary topic that understands the world as a theatre. Ortega identifies the person as an actor who must become the character that his vocation writes. This implies a conception of «my life», understood as my creation, which is contrary to the Theatrum Mundi’s, in which the actor is assigned a previously written role. However his definition of the actor as embodied metaphor could converge with its metaphysical notion of man as an existential metaphor. Ortega is not explicit on this point, though.KEYWORDS«THE IDEA OF THEATRE», THEATRUM MUNDI, VOCATION, RES DRAMATICA, EMBODIED METAPHOR. (shrink)

I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgments of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth (...) governs judgment to substantiate the thesis that truth’s normative function varies according to the subject matter at issue. I then argue that truth’s normative guidance in the domain of taste is characteristically weak. I introduce an intuitive distinction between basic and refined taste, and show how this distinction affects questions of faultlessness and parity. Last, I discuss the idea of alethic suberogation in connection with disagreement about refined taste. (shrink)

Can someone who suspends judgement about a certain proposition <p> be in a relational state of disagreement with someone who believes <p> as well as with some- one who disbelieves <p>? This paper argues for an af- firmative answer. It develops an account of the notions of suspended judgement and disagreement that explains how and why the suspender is in a relational state of disagreement with both the believer and the disbeliever about the very same proposition <p>. More specifically, the (...) paper first provides a characterisation of the norma- tive profile associated with the state of suspended judge- ment in terms of the set of normative commitments that it engenders in the context of inquiry. It then provides a characterisation of the notion of disagreement in terms the incompatibility between the sets of normative com- mitments characteristic of the three states in question— belief, disbelief, and suspension. (shrink)

Tracing a central theme of Plato's Republic , G. R. F. Ferrari reconsiders in this study the nature and purpose of the comparison between the structure of society and that of the individual soul. In four chapters, Ferrari examines the personalities and social status of the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato's notion of justice, coherence in Plato's description of the decline of states, and the tyrant and the philosopher king—a pair who, in their different ways, break with the (...) terms of the city-soul analogy. In addition to acknowledging familiar themes in the interpretation of the Republic —the sincerity of its utopianism, the justice of the philosopher's return to the Cave—Ferrari provocatively engages secondary literature by Leo Strauss, Bernard Williams, and Jonathan Lear. With admirable clarity and insight, Ferrari conveys the relation between the city and the soul and the choice between tyranny and philosophy. City and Soul in Plato's Republic will be of value to students of classics, philosophy, and political theory alike. (shrink)

In this paper I offer some critical comments to MacFarlane's recent book "Assessment Sensitivity". I focus primarily on MacFarlane's understanding of the normative aspects of enquiry—in particular I take issue with the phenomena of retraction and disagreement as preclusion of joint accuracy. I argue that both notions are problematic and that—at least in the case of basic taste—they are not needed in order to account for our intuitions.

I have two objectives in this paper. The first is to investigate whether, and to what extent, truth is valuable. I do this by first isolating the value question from other normative questions. Second, I import into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions hailing from value theory. This will help us to clarify the sense in which truth is valuable. I then argue that there is significant variability in the value of truth in different areas of (...) discourse. I shall call this the axiological variability conjecture. I illustrate and substantiate AVC by contrasting the occurrence of disagreement in two paradigmatically evaluative areas of discourse, viz. matters of taste, on the one hand, and morality, on the other. I claim that there is a reasonable tendency to care much more about settling moral disagreements than taste disagreements and that this difference has to do, at least partly but significantly, with the different value that truth exhibits in these two areas of discourse. I then turn to the second objective of the paper—namely, to discuss how pluralistic accounts of the nature of truth may deal with the value of truth in light of AVC. I will argue that AVC is a problem for all versions of truth pluralism that are committed to the following two theses: that truth is a value concept; and that this characteristic of the concept has to be reflected in the metaphysical nature of any admissible truth properties—i.e., all the various properties that are admissible in the pluralist account are value-conferring properties and thus intrinsically valuable. In so doing, I will focus primarily on Michael Lynch’s functionalist incarnation of truth pluralism. Lynch terms this “Manifestation Alethic Pluralism”. My reason for this is twofold: first and foremost, MAP is a paradigmatic exemplification of a model of truth pluralism that is committed to both and ; second, MAP has, to date, enjoyed the most discussion, and currently provides the most developed account of truth pluralism. However, I argue that MAP lacks the resources to account for AVC. Owing to this, I suggest two ways out for an advocate of MAP, which force various structural changes in her view. (shrink)

Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that the only acceptable domain of quantification is the first-order domain of particulars. Nominalists may assert that second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within the first-order domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to second-order entities, by means of an appropriate semantics called “substitutional”. In this paper I argue that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of Nominalists to maintain that identity, and equivalence relations more in general, (...) is first-order and invariant. Firstly, I explain why Nominalists are formally bound to this first-order concept of identity. Secondly, I show that the resources needed to justify identity, a certain conception of identity invariance, are out of the Nominalist’s reach. (shrink)

This article begins at a crossroads; it straddles the difficult ground between the recent public outcry against sexual violence and concerns about the coloniality of voice made visible by the recent decolonial turn within feminist theory. Wary of concepts such as “visibility” or “transparency”—principles that continue to inform the call to “break the silence” by “speaking up” central to Western liberatory movements—in this article, I return to silence, laying the groundwork for the exploration of what a revised concept of silence (...) could mean for the development of practices of cross-cultural communication that do not play into coloniality. (shrink)

Schlick’s relationship with the Tractatus has been mainly investigated in what concerns the conception both of language and world, the insight of logic, the criteria of verifiability, the proper role of philosophy as mental activity. However, some other features of Schlick’s reading of the Tractatus require a closer consideration. In the 1920s, Schlick was dealing with the questions of ethics (and, to some extent, of religion), that represent from the early days the core issue of his philosophy of culture. Schlick’s (...) intellectual relationship with Wittgenstein ought to be explored also in this broader context, namely after his first encounter with the Tractatus. As it emerges from their private conversations in 1929, Schlick did not agree with Wittgenstein’s account of ethics as a domain going beyond the limits of language. Whereas Wittgenstein maintains that “that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same [Tractatus 6.421]”, Schlick considers ethics as a factual science. As he says in the Problems of ethics (1930), “if there are ethical questions that have meaning, and are therefore able to be answered, then ethics is a science”. Wittgenstein’s position is patently in contrast with Schlick’s. According to Wittgenstein, ethics, no differently from religion, cannot be tested as is usual for meaningful propositions, namely by recurring to hypotheses, high probability or knowing. My paper aims at highlighting this contrast, that is rooted both in the Tractatus and in Schlick’s conception of ethics as science already endorsed in his work before the arriving in Vienna. How Schlick would have appreciated Wittgenstein’s late thoughts on ethics remains, at any rate, an open question. (shrink)

The production, manipulation and exploitation of future visions are increasingly important elements in practices of visioneering socio-technical processes of innovation and transformation. This becomes obvious in new and emerging science and technologies and large-scale transformations of established socio-technical systems. A variety of science and technology studies provide evidence on correlations between expectations and anticipatory practices with the dynamics of such processes of change. Technology assessment responded to the challenges posed by the influence of visions on the processes by elaborating methodologies (...) for a “vision assessment” as a contribution to what is now increasingly known as “hermeneutical TA”. But until now, the practical functions of visions in the processes have not been explained in a way that satisfies the empirical needs of TA’s vision assessment—that is to provide future-oriented knowledge based on the analysis of ongoing changes in the present without knowing the future outcomes. Our leading hypothesis is that we can only understand the practical roles of visions in current processes if we analyse them as socio-epistemic practices which simultaneously produce new knowledge and enable new social arrangements. We elaborate this by means of two cases: the visions of In Vitro meat and of the smart grid. Here, we interpret visioneering more in its collective dimension as a contingent and open-ended process, emerging from heterogeneous socio-epistemic practices. This paper aims at improving TA’s vision assessments and related STS research on visionary practices for real-time analysis and assessments. (shrink)

A proof is given that the set of maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property and the set of maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunction property and the explicit definability property have the power of continuum. To prove our results, we introduce various notions which might be interesting by themselves. In particular, we illustrate a method to generate wide sets of pairwise "constructively incompatible constructive logics". We use a notion of "semiconstructive" logic and define wide sets of "constructive" (...) logics by representing the "constructive" logics as "limits" of decreasing sequences of "semiconstructive" logics. Also, we introduce some generalizations of the usual filtration techniques for propositional logics. For instance, "filtrations over rank formulas" are used to show that any two different logics belonging to a suitable uncountable set of "constructive" logics are "constructively incompatible". (shrink)

The heristic argument with which Meno questions the possibility of inquiry and knowledge is tackled by Socrates through the reference to an archaic and religious doctrine, according to which the soul is immortal and has seen all things. Through this reference Socrates actually wants to affirm the affinity between the soul and the world of forms. So behind the myth of the prenatal vision of forms by the soul Plato intends to assert the ontological condition of the soul, that is, (...) its affinity to forms. (shrink)

This is the second part of a paper devoted to the study of the maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property , whose first part has appeared in this journal with the title “A method to single out maximal propositional logics with the disjunction property I”. In the first part we have explained the general results upon which a method to single out maximal constructive logics is based and have illustrated such a method by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of (...) maximal constructive logics extending the logic ST of Scott, for which, in turn, a semantical characterization in terms of Kripke frames has been given. In the present part we complete the illustration of the method of the first part, having in mind some aspects which might be interesting for a classification of the maximal constructive logics, and an application of the heuristic content of the method to detect the nonmaximality of apparently maximal constructive logics. Thus, on the one hand we introduce the logic AST , which is compared with ST and is seen as a logic “alternative” to it, in a sense which will be precisely explained. We provide a Kripke semantics for AST and show that there are maximal constructive logics which neither are extensions of ST nor are extensions of AST. Finally, we give a further application of the results of the first part by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of a maximal constructive logic extending AST. On the other hand, we compare the maximal constructive logics presented in both parts of the paper with a constructive logic introduced by Maksimova , which has been conjectured to be maximal by Chagrov and Zacharyashchev ; from this comparison a disproof of the conjecture arises. (shrink)

Animals and TechnoscienceThe essays in the section “Animals in technoscientific developments” have been collected from the submissions to the 3rd European Conference of Critical Animal Studies that I organized in Karlsruhe on 28–30 November 2013. The aim of the conference was to stimulate critical scholars to engage on the multifaceted relationships between animals and technosciences, an under-researched topic.Technoscience has become an important concept in the current debate on the epistemic and normative changes taking place in how scientific and technological research (...) is currently being conducted. Although there are different modes of describing technoscience , generally speaking the term refers to a means of developing knowledge in which it is not possible to separate the scientific from the technological . In contrast to the “traditional mode o .. (shrink)

In this talk I consider a body of my more recent work in order to isolate the shared approach that it takes to reading Platonic dialogue, an approach which had been absent from my writing on Plato up to that point and is largely absent from any of the traditions that influence how most of us read Plato. Its key feature is a refusal to treat the character Socrates as operating as if he were Plato’s secret agent within the dialogue—as (...) if one should attribute to Socrates all of the cunning and the control with which one might credit instead the author who scripted Socrates’s habitual triumphs. The focus of this new approach is rather on Plato’s “writerly” philosophizing: on how Plato exploits the distinction between what he and his character Socrates are up to as philosophers in order to guide our sense of his own activity and aims as a philosophic writer. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophical relationship between Clarence Irving Lewis and Moritz Schlick, questioning their understanding of verificationism. At stake is not only the crucial point of the possibility of verifying statements regarding, for instance, the other side of the moon, but also the proper status of ethical values in opposition to, or in connection with, scientific propositions grounded in experience. This latter aspect can better explain how both Lewis and Schlick understand the notion of experience in general, posing the (...) conceptual framework within which Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism established a dialogue in the 1930s but still worthy of closer inquiry. (shrink)

In this paper, I attend to the ontological shift in Merleau-Ponty’s later writing and suggest that this conceptual turn opens the space for questions of the latent sense of the sensible foreclosed by dualist accounts and propositional theories of meaning. By attending to the Nature Lectures, I claim that there is a sens [meaning and orientation] of nature whose regulatory principle ought to be found in nature itself. This is to say that there is a normativity of nature that, albeit (...) not exclusive of sociocultural-linguistic norms, is irreducible to them. As I argue, this normativity is a “transspatializing and transtemporalizing”: it transverses its carnal manifestations, thereby inaugurating and becoming traceable within their materialization while remaining invisible in its excess or poietic renewing. I conclude by attending to the question of the “latent sense” of nature, suggesting that this sense is not conceptual or propositional, but intuitive as in the sense of right and left, a sense that is distributed across spatio-temporal individuals and emerges via the play of yet-to-be-determined incarnate manifestations.Dans cet article, j’aborde le tournant ontologique du dernier Merleau-Ponty et je suggère qu’il implique une interrogation sur le sens latent du sensible, exclu par les approches dualistes ainsi que par les théories propositionnelles de la signification. En analysant les cours sur la Nature, je vise à montrer qu’il y a un sens [signification et direction] de la nature, dont le principe régulateur est à chercher dans la nature elle-même. Cela revient à dire qu’il y a une normativité de la nature qui, bien qu’elle n’exclue pas les normes socio-culturelles-linguistiques, ne leur est pas pour autant réductible. Une telle normativité est « trans-spatiale et trans-temporelle » : elle traverse ses manifestations charnelles, en inaugurant ainsi et en devenant traçable dans ses matérialisations, tout en demeurant invisible dans son excès et dans son renouvellement poïétique. Je termine en abordant la question du « sens latent » de la nature, en suggérant que ce sens n’est ni conceptuel ni propositionnel, mais intuitif, tout comme l’est le sens de la droite et de la gauche, c’est-à-dire un sens qui est distribué à travers les individus spatio-temporels et qui émerge dans le jeu des manifestations incarnées encore-à-déterminer.In questo articolo intendo esaminare la svolta ontologica degli ultimi scritti di Merleau-Ponty per suggerire come questa apra ad un’interrogazione sul senso latente del sensibile, che rimane escluso dagli approcci dualistici e dalle teorie proposizionali del significato. Analizzando i corsi sulla Natura, vorrei mostrare come vi sia un senso [significato e orientamento] della natura il cui principio regolatore deve essere rintracciato nella natura stessa. Ciò significa che vi è una normatività della natura che, benché non esclusiva delle norme socioculturali-linguistiche, è irriducibile ad esse. Questa normatività è “trans-spaziale e trans-temporale”: essa attraversa le sue manifestazioni carnali, inaugurando e divenendo tracciabile nelle sue materializzazioni, pur rimanendo invisibile nella sua eccedenza o rinnovamento poietico. Concludo soffermandomi sulla questione del “senso latente” della natura, suggerendo che questo senso non è concettuale o proposizionale, ma intuitivo al modo del senso della destra e della sinistra, un senso che è distribuito attraverso gli individui spazio-temporali e che emerge nel gioco delle manifestazioni incarnate ancora-da-determinare. (shrink)

As recent scholarship has repeatedly shown, the history of Vienna Circle is to some extent rooted in the tradition of Austrian Philosophy which Neurath considered as not involved in the “Kantian interlude”. Nevertheless, it seems that the heritage of Leibniz and, in particular, of his “reform of logic” has been hitherto neglected. Indeed, Leibnizianism (along with Herbartianism) represents a main feature of this tradition stretching from Bolzano to quite forgotten figures as Exner and Zimmermann, and still influent on the Brentano (...) circle. This paper attempt to highlight the role played by Leibniz in framing of the “scientific world conception”, focusing in particular both on Carnap’s and Neurath’s stance towards the characteristica universalis underlying the project of the encyclopedia Leibniz aimed to realize. (shrink)

This is the first part of a paper concerning intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property which cannot be properly extended into logics of the same kind, and are therefore called maximal. To deal with these logics, we use a method based on the search of suitable nonstandard logics, which has an heuristic content and has allowed us to discover a wide family of logics, as well as to get their maximality proofs in a uniform way. The present part illustrates (...) infinitely many maximal logics with the disjunction property extending the well-known logic of Scott, and aims to provide a first picture of the method, sufficient for the reader who wish to achieve an overall understanding of it without entering into the further aspects developed in the second part. From this point of view, the latter will not be self-standing, but will be seen as a prosecution and a complement of the former, with the aim that the material presented in the whole paper can be used as a starting point for a classification of the subject. (shrink)

This note examines Fulvio Tessitore’s objections formulated in his critical review of Massimo Ferrari’s paper Non solo sentieri interrotti . According to the author, Tessitore has misunderstood his interpretation of historicism, as well as his interpretation of the German philosophy within the Italian philosophical culture after the Second World War. Moreover, Tessitore suggests that the author’s position is the consequence of a sort of prejudice towards the history of philosophy practised in Napoli. The author shows the incorrectness of this (...) opinion, trying to sketch another view of this philosophical enterprise beyond any geographic boundary and local patriotism. (shrink)

En este libro, que aparece en Italia en 1987, publicado muchas veces y muy comentado también en el extranjero, Vincenzo Ferrari analiza las funciones sociales del derecho en una perspectiva relativista, subjetivista y conflictualista, opuesta a la del funcionalismo sociológico. De tal manera, el derecho se revela como un medio de acción social dirigido a lograr los proyectos de seres humanos empeñados en relaciones variables de cooperación y de lucha. Así, se muestra cómo las normas jurídicas pueden orientar las (...) actitudes y desorientarlas; solucionar los conflictos y agravarlos o fomentarlos; legitimar cualquier forma de poder con argumentos tan válidos como ficticios. Solo al nivel de los ideales se redescubre el valor del derecho, su potencialidad libertadora y su naturaleza igualitaria. (shrink)

David Eso and Kay Burns edition of philosopher Leo Ferraris previously unpublished 1973 manuscript brings to light a long forgotten satirical work, which, in an age of fake news, possesses renewed relevance. The editors contextualize The Earth is Flat! for the reader with a scholarly introduction and a humorous Forewarning. Author, Leo Ferrari, draws on his extensive knowledge of classical thought and its key figures to present a history of ideas that is sometimes accurate, sometimes speculative. Speculative or alternative (...) aspects of this history support his Flat Earth theme, as do a number of scientific experiments outlined, which the reader is encouraged to try. He traces the conflict between Globularist and Planoterrestrial beliefs from antiquity to his contemporary moment of the early 1970s, marked by space exploration. Later chapters chart the activities and philosophies of the Flat Earth Society of Canada, including Ferraris experience on the lecture circuit and in media platforms. The authors method is to blur the line between seriousness and humour and to show that intellectual work can also be good fun. He uses the idea of a spinning, spherical planet to symbolically represent the alienating effects of technological modernity. (shrink)

Since 1993, when Hudelmaier developed an O(n log n)-space decision procedure for propositional Intuitionistic Logic, a lot of work has been done to improve the efficiency of the related proof-search algorithms. In this paper a tableau calculus using the signs T, F and Fc with a new set of rules to treat signed formulas of the kind T((A → B) → C) is provided. The main feature of the calculus is the reduction of both the non-determinism in proof-search and the (...) width of proofs with respect to Hudelmaier's one. These improvements have a significant influence on the performances of the implementation. (shrink)

I agree with Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith in their critique of Residual Normality. However, first-person data must be integrated into their account of neurobiological development of disabilities. Furthermore, psychological development itself is not only about an individual’ brain and how it interacts with the world; rather, development depends crucially on the sociocultural context in which children develop.

Starting with the acknowledgment of the necessity of radical imagination for social change, and with the threat that neoliberal capitalism poses to radical imagination, our hope is that this themed issue offers the time and space to cultivate radical imagination as it takes up questions of racial justice. Moreover, our intent is to solicit critical phenomenology toward robust investigations of radical imagination, what it makes possible, and the ways in which current social, economic, and political arrangements sustain or foreclose the (...) space and time for its cultivation. What the past few years have made clear is that individuals and institutions continue to be complicit in the perpetuation of structural inequality and racial violence in our society. For us, the editors of Puncta, acknowledging this complicity means at a minimum to use our platform to amplify the voices of scholars of color and establish a forum devoted to critical conversations about racial justice. In sum, we hope we can create a space-time for the cultivation of radical imagination. This themed issue strives to be such a venue; the ten articles featured in this issue explore the intersections of race/racialization with methodological concerns within the field of critical phenomenology, theoretical understandings of the notion of race itself, and demands for racial justice on scholarly, activist, and imaginary grounds. (shrink)